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Abstract 
___________________________________________ 
 
Casino self-exclusion is a procedure by which individuals can have themselves 
banned from entering a casino.  One of the purposes of this paper is to present 
information about the availability and features of these programmes.  A second 
purpose is to make recommendations about how to best operate them based on 
cross-jurisdictional analysis and lessons from the addiction literature.  The first 
section of the paper describes the typical casino self-exclusion programme, 
outlining the features common to most policies.  The second section provides a 
detailed overview of the programmes operating in Canada in order to give the 
reader an appreciation of the procedural variations that exist.  The third section 
discusses the effectiveness of self-exclusion programmes.  Finally, the fourth 
section contains recommendations on ways to improve effectiveness.  When 
properly implemented, self-exclusion can be a valuable tool in helping to curb 
problem gambling. 
___________________________________________ 
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Casino self-exclusion is a programme that enables individuals to have themselves banned 
from entering a casino.  It is different from the involuntary bans that casinos initiate to 
exclude unruly customers, people suspected of cheating, and criminals or figures in organised 
crime. Informal policies to discourage problem gamblers have been used by casinos for some 
time.  However, the first formal self-exclusion programme was initiated in 1989 in Manitoba, 
Canada, coincident with the opening of Canadas first permanent, year-round casino.  In the 
Netherlands, Holland Casino developed a programme in 1990.  In the United States, a tribal 
casino in Connecticut implemented a self-exclusion programme in 1994, and Missouri 
developed the first state-wide programme in 1996.  In the past few years, many casinos and 
jurisdictions around the world have adopted self-exclusion measures as part of their 
responsible gaming programmes. 
 
Despite their wide availability, there is a lack of information about these programmes.  To 
date, there is only one published study on the topic (Ladouceur, Jacques, Giroux, Ferland and 
Leblond 2000).  Thus, one of the purposes of this paper is to present information about the 
availability and features of these programmes, as gathered from the people who actually 
administer them.  The second purpose of this paper is to make recommendations concerning 
how to best operate these programmes.  Cross-jurisdictional analysis and lessons from the 
addiction literature provide valuable direction on how to maximize their effectiveness.      
 
This paper is organised into four sections.  The first section describes the typical casino self-
exclusion programme, outlining the features common to most policies and the demographic 
characteristics of excludees.  The second section provides a detailed overview of the 
programmes operating in Canada in order to give the reader an appreciation of the procedural 
variations that exist.  The third section discusses the effectiveness of self-exclusion 
programmes in curbing problem gambling.  The final section contains recommendations on 
ways to improve their effectiveness. 
 
The Prototypical Casino Self-Exclusion Programme 
Most casinos/jurisdictions advertise their self-exclusion programmes on their website and/or 
through pamphlets available at the casino(s). Persons wishing to self-exclude can usually sign 
up at any one of the licensed casinos in their jurisdiction.  In some cases, registration may 
also be available at the office of the casino regulators.  Individuals fill out an application and 
have their photograph taken.  They are advised that help is available for problem gambling, 
and provided with a number for more information or an actual contact for problem gambling 
counselling.      
 
The self-exclusion contract may apply just to one casino, or to all casinos in the jurisdiction, 
with coordination between venues.  The exclusion does not usually apply to other gambling 
venues, such as bingo halls or racetracks.  Self-exclusion programmes usually require casino 
operators to remove excludees from mailing lists, thus halting any mailings of promotional 
enticements.  The policy may also require casinos to refer to their list of self-excluded 
persons before issuing new players cards, cashing cheques, extending credit, or paying out 
large jackpots. 
 
Self-exclusion contracts are generally irrevocable for the time period covered, although some 
jurisdictions have a process for agreements to be revoked.  Some jurisdictions offer a fixed 
time period, such as a lifetime ban or a specified period.  Others offer a choice of ban length, 
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ranging from 6 months to lifetime.  Requirements for re-entry vary, with some jurisdictions 
having no requirements and others requiring a waiting period or a formal review process. 
 
Casino security personnel enforce casino self-exclusion policies.  Casinos are absolved of any 
legal responsibility in the event that a self-exclusion contract is breached.  Gamblers who 
violate their exclusion are usually prevented from collecting any winnings or recovering any 
losses.  In some jurisdictions, violators may simply be asked to leave.  In other jurisdictions, 
they may be subject to a trespassing charge and/or fine. 
 
Demographic characteristics of excludees 
The majority of people who sign up for self-exclusion appear to be male problem gamblers 
with significant gambling debts.  In the Netherlands, the records of 6754 Holland Casino 
visitors who requested self-exclusion or visit limitation between 1 January 1998 and 1 April 
2000 were analysed.  The results revealed that 75% were male, with an average age of 39, 
and 25% were female, with an average age of 46 (De Bruin, Leenders, Fris, Verbraeck, 
Braam, van de Wijngaart 2001).  In Switzerland, 90% of the 382 casino exclusions signed 
between 2000 and 2001 were voluntary.  Eighty-four percent of these individuals were men, 
and the most common age group was 31 to 40 year olds (37%) (Haefeli 2002). 
 
Ladouceur et al. (2000) found that in their sample of 220 self-excluded individuals in 
Québec, 62% were men, and the mean age was 41 years.  About two-thirds (67%) lived with 
a spouse, and 58% had children.  The modal annual income ranged from $21,000 to $31,000 
Cdn.  Ninety-five percent of the participants were probable pathological gamblers, scoring 5 
or more on the SOGS (South Oaks Gambling Screen). Seventy-one percent reported having 
gambling debts, with an average of $11,962 Cdn per person.  Almost two-thirds had 
borrowed money in order to gamble.   
 
In Connecticut, USA, Steinberg and Velardo (2002) found that in a sample of 184 self-
excluded individuals, 60% were men, the mean age was 40 years, 76% were Caucasian, 41% 
were married, 91% were employed full- or part-time, and the modal household income was 
over $60,000 US. Sixty-four percent reported they had a problem with slots, and 40% had a 
problem with blackjack.  Other types of gambling that were problematic were casino video 
poker (16%), lottery scratch-off (15%), non-casino cards (15%), craps/dice (15%), casino 
poker (14%), and non-casino video poker (9%).  Over 96% were probable pathological 
gamblers, and the average debt was $19,608 US.   
 
Casino Self-Exclusion in Canada 
Permanent casinos exist in the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario, Québec, and Nova Scotia, but not in Newfoundland, Prince Edward 
Island, New Brunswick, the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, or Nunavut.  All provinces 
with casinos offer some form of a voluntary exclusion programme for patrons.  Many 
individual casinos had their own self-exclusion programmes prior to the implementation of a 
province-wide programme.   
 
As of August 6, 1999, British Columbia casinos have been required to participate in the 
"Casino Self Exclusion Program" administered by the British Columbia Lottery Corporation 
(BCLC).  Registration is available at each of the casinos, as well as three BCLC offices.  
Self-exclusion is revocable; if a person wishes to be removed from the self-exclusion list, 
they must complete a casino self-exclusion revocation form.  The request is reviewed by the 
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BCLC manager, Casino Security and Surveillance, and a decision is made whether to revoke 
the agreement or not  (S. MacFarlane, BCLC, personal communication, Nov. 501; Proctor 
2001).  British Columbia does not have a Gaming Act, and as a result, there are no penalties 
in place for individuals who breach their self-exclusion agreement.  Because the casino 
service provider does not always report breaches of self-exclusion contracts to BCLC, it is 
not known exactly how many people have violated their agreements.  However, BCLC is 
aware of an average of three to five self-excluded people detected in casinos each week.  In 
January of 2002, BCLC assumed responsibility for 37 commercial bingo halls in the 
province.  They are planning to extend the entire problem gambling programme, including 
self-exclusion, to these bingo halls (S. MacFarlane, BCLC, personal communication, Nov. 
5/01; Feb. 5/02). 
 
In Alberta, the province-wide self-exclusion programme began on September 18, 2000.  It is 
a joint effort by the Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission (AGLC), the gaming industry, 
and the Alberta Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission (AADAC).  The programme is 
administered by the AGLC and enforced by casino security staff.  Registration is available at 
all casinos and at two AGLC offices, and forms are available on the AGLC website.  
AADAC also recently implemented a problem gambling programme for industry staff to 
raise awareness and train senior staff to refer individuals to AADAC programs and services  
(Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission 2001; Government of Alberta 2000).   
 
Voluntary admission bans have been available in Saskatchewan since 1997. The 
Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority operates four casinos but did not release details on 
their programme to the authors.  The Saskatchewan Gaming Corporation (SGC) policy, 
which applies to Casino Regina, allows for a ban of up to five years.  Guests who violate their 
voluntary ban receive a letter reminding them of their ban.  Upon a second violation, the 
voluntary exclusion is converted to an involuntary exclusion for the remainder of the original 
ban.  A third violation could result in a charge and a possible extension of the ban (D. Casper 
(SGC), personal communication, Nov. 26/01).  Individuals may request a waiver of their ban 
prior to its expiry, but this is not common, and is possible only if the patron can demonstrate 
that steps have been taken to address the problem (i.e., a letter from an addictions counsellor). 
A ban of less than one year will not be revoked, and a ban of greater than one year will not be 
shortened during the first year of the ban.  Should a request for a waiver be denied, the 
voluntary admission ban becomes an involuntary ban.  The individual may request an appeal 
with the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA).  A hearing will be set to 
review the issue, with SLGA having the final decision.  Families may be allowed to make a 
case in which they request someone be removed from the casino  (D. Casper (SGC), personal 
communication, Nov. 26/01).   
 
In Manitoba, a voluntary exclusion programme has been in place since 1989, when it was 
implemented at the Crystal Casino.  This location eventually closed, and self-exclusion was 
subsequently implemented at two new Winnipeg casinos in 1993.  Registration is available at 
each of the casinos.  Prior to 1999, self-exclusion was for an indefinite period.  Now it is for 
two years, after which individuals may apply to the Vice President of Corporate Security, 
Manitoba Lottery Corporation (MLC) for re-entry to the casinos.  Part of the MLC 
requirement for re-entry is attendance at a half-day gambling awareness workshop with the 
Addictions Foundation of Manitoba.  The gambling awareness workshop includes a review of 
past gambling history, information on how gambling works (e.g., randomness; house 
advantage; cost), and a plan for returning to gamble (Addictions Foundation of Manitoba 
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[AFM] 2000).  This programme must be completed in the two-month period immediately 
prior to the end of the voluntary exclusion period (C. Clarke, (MLC), personal 
communication, Nov. 27/01; K. Langevin (MLC), personal communication, Aug. 20/01; 
Ward 2001). 
 
Three commercial casinos opened in Ontario between 1994 and 1996, each offering its own 
independent self-exclusion programme.  These three programmes were eventually combined 
into a single common format.  In December 1999, a new programme was implemented for all 
Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLGC) sites, including 15 slot facilities at 
racetracks and 5 charity casinos.  Individuals may sign up for self-exclusion at any of the 
casinos or slots-at-tracks.  OLGC is a Crown agency responsible for all of these facilities, 
although the self-exclusion programme is administered at the casinos. Individuals cannot 
apply for reinstatement until six months after the date of self-exclusion.  If individuals sign a 
reinstatement request, they must wait an additional 30 days before being allowed to enter 
gaming facilities.  After three self-exclusion contracts, individuals are automatically self-
excluded for a minimum of five years. (S. Ramondt, (OLGC), personal communication, Oct. 
17/01).   
 
In Québec, a self-exclusion programme was developed by the Société des Casinos du 
Québec, and was implemented at each casino upon opening, between 1993 and 1996.  The 
programme is operated by each of the three casinos and, unlike other Canadian programmes 
which provide a province-wide ban, it allows clients to self-exclude themselves from one, 
two or all three casinos.  An annual report on the self-exclusion programme is submitted to 
the Department of Problem Gambling Research and Prevention at Loto-Québecs head office 
(Loto-Québec 2001b).  Since 1996, the three casinos together have averaged about 2,000 self-
exclusion agreements per year.   
 
Voluntary exclusion has been available in Nova Scotia since 1995.  Individuals may obtain 
registration forms from the Nova Scotia Alcohol and Gaming Authority (NSAGA) offices or 
website, the Gaming Corporation, and casinos in Halifax and Sydney.  Nova Scotia is the 
only province that requires a hearing for reinstatement. If an excluded participant wishes to 
be reinstated, he or she must request an Application for Reinstatement of Access to the 
Casinos form from the NSAGA. The applicant will be asked to sign the Consent to 
Investigation form, which gives the Authority permission to investigate the individuals 
personal and financial information.  Following the investigation, a hearing is held before the 
Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board to review the information.  The applicant has the 
option of signing a Refusal to Consent to Investigation form.  However, this form is 
presented as evidence during the application for reinstatement (NSAGA).  Between 1997 and 
2002, 49 requests for reinstatement were approved, 22 were denied, and 8 were adjourned or 
rescinded for various reasons (J. Baltzer, NSAGA, personal communication, May 28/02).   
 
Table 1 summarises information on self-exclusion programmes for each of the Canadian 
provinces.  Some information was unavailable, because the jurisdiction either did not keep 
records or was unwilling to disclose their records.  For example, provincial figures were not 
available from Saskatchewan, because individual casinos maintain their own records.  Thus, 
the figures from Casino Regina were used.  With regard to the number of violated self-
exclusions, most provinces do not keep detailed records.  An exception is Québec, where 
casinos employ security guards whose main duty is to detect self-excluded individuals.  This 
factor, combined with the lack of a penalty for breaching an exclusion agreement, results in a 
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dramatically higher number of detected violations.  In other jurisdictions, one can presume 
that a significant number of self-excluded individuals go undetected.  Because there is no 
reliable way to determine the number of undetected violations, it is difficult to make any 
conclusions about the effectiveness of self-exclusion based on the number of reported 
violations.  
 
___________________________________________ 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
___________________________________________ 
 
Regarding the number of self-exclusion contracts, some provinces provided the current 
number, while others provided the total number.  This difference should be taken into 
consideration when making comparisons, as one can assume that the total (cumulative) 
number will be larger than the current number.  It also should be noted that larger numbers of 
self-exclusions for the provinces of Ontario and Québec are due to the much larger 
populations of these two provinces.  As seen under utilisation rates, the actual proportion of 
self-exclusion contracts relative to the number of problem gamblers is similar to what is 
obtained in other provinces.   
 
Effectiveness of Self-Exclusion Programmes 
The effectiveness of casino self-exclusion programmes can be measured in several ways.  
The most straightforward measure concerns the percentage of people who sign contracts who 
do not actually re-enter the casino(s) during the period of exclusion.  There is very limited 
evidence on this topic.  Ladouceur et al. (2000) studied 220 individuals self-excluded from a 
Québec casino.  A subset of 53 individuals from this group went back to renew or re-establish 
a self-exclusion contract.  Of this group, 64% reported not entering the casino during their 
previous exclusion period.  However the 36% who did return reported going back a median 
of six times.  Steinberg and Velardo (2002) studied a small subset (n=20) of the 294 
excludees at the Mohegan Sun Casino in Connecticut.  Here again, most reported they did not 
return to the casino during the period of exclusion, but the majority of the 20% that did return 
went back more than 9 times.  Much higher compliance occurs in the Netherlands where 
personal identification is required to enter any of the 12 casinos operated by Holland Casino.  
A computer system registers all visits and immediately identifies anyone who has requested a 
ban or visit limitation (De Bruin et al. 2001). 
 
Because gambling can occur outside of casinos and in other casinos outside the jurisdiction, it 
is also important to examine the impact self-exclusion has on overall gambling behaviour.  
Again, there is very little known about this.  Of the 53 individuals who went back to renew a 
self-exclusion contract at a Québec casino, only 30% reported that they had stopped gambling 
completely during their previous contract (which had typically been for a period of 6  12 
months) (Ladouceur et al. 2000).  Two previous studies reported that about half of self-
excluded patrons found alternative ways to gamble, such as illegal gambling or electronic 
gaming machines outside of casinos (De Bruin et al. 2001; Ladouceur et al. 2000).  
Furthermore, a study completed in the Netherlands found that a large percentage of people 
who requested a ban or visit limitation eventually returned to the casino following the period 
of restriction.  Some had a sharp increase in visiting frequency in the following six months, 
although the visiting frequency of most people stabilised over time at less than eight visits per 
month (De Bruin et al. 2001).    
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Critics have questioned the impact of self-exclusion programmes on problem gambling, 
considering that many problem gamblers do not believe they have a problem. Self-exclusion 
programmes have the potential to work only for those who recognise their problem, and are 
willing to admit to it and take action to deal with the problem.  Furthermore, considering the 
lax enforcement of self-exclusion, it is quite possible that success for many individuals has 
less to do with enforcement, and more to do with the persons decision to curb their gambling 
and their public proclamation of this decision. 
 
It is also instructive to examine the utilisation rate these programmes have within the general 
population of problem gamblers.  Overall, the number of self-exclusion is quite low relative 
to population of problem gamblers.  In Canada, the prevalence of problem gamblers in the 
adult population is estimated to be between 2.7% to 5.5%, depending on the province 
(Azmier 2001).  Based on the number of current or total self-exclusion contracts, only .4% to 
1.5% of problem gamblers in Canada currently use self-exclusion.  Utilisation rates are likely 
even lower in other countries where self-exclusion programmes are less common and have 
been in place for a shorter period of time.   
 
The Netherlands is one noteworthy example of a jurisdiction that appears to have achieved 
higher utilisation rates.  Between January 1, 1998, and April 1, 2000, there were 9,878 
protective measures (self-exclusion or visit limitation) taken out by casino patrons.  Since 
1990, it is estimated that 25,000 protective measures have been arranged.  Out of a random 
sample of 50 problem gamblers (i.e. score of 5 or higher on South Oaks Gambling Screen), 
40% had been reached by Holland Casinos prevention policy.  These individuals either had 
asked for a protective measure, or had been approached by Holland Casino about their 
gambling behaviour (De Bruin et al. 2001).  The reason for this higher utilisation rate is 
discussed in the next section on Recommendations for Improving Effectiveness. 
 
To be fair, not all problem gamblers have problems with casino games.  However, evidence 
suggests that problem gamblers do have disproportionately high rates of casino use (Gerstein, 
Volberg, Murphy, Toce, et al. 1999; Australian Productivity Commission [APC] 1999) and 
spend somewhat more on casino table games and electronic gaming machines then other 
types of gambling (Volberg, Gerstein, Christiansen, and Baldridge 2001).  It also needs to be 
pointed out that casino self-exclusion is a fairly new procedure and not yet widely known.  
Nonetheless, it is very clear that at this point very few problem gamblers are reached through 
this procedure in most jurisdictions.   
 
Recommendations for Improving Self-exclusion Programmes 
Clearly, significant improvements need to be made in how self-exclusion programmes are 
implemented and operated.  There has been some debate among addictions experts and 
gaming officials regarding the best ways to operate self-exclusion programmes.  Based on 
cross-jurisdictional analysis and lessons from the addiction literature, we offer the following 
recommendations to be considered by policy-makers and gaming regulators. 
 
Recommendation #1: Mandatory promotion of self-exclusion programmes 
Part of the reason for the low utilisation rate of self-exclusion is lack of awareness.  Several 
studies indicate that self-exclusion programmes are not being promoted.  In Australia, the 
Interchurch Gambling Taskforce [IGT] (2000) concluded that promotion of self-exclusion 
programmes was not immediately visible in many venues.  Spot checks on 41 venues from 
September 1999 to April 2000 found the programme visibly promoted in only 10% of 
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venues, and in these venues it was often promoted indirectly through a brochure.  The Nova 
Scotia Alcohol and Gaming Authority [NSAGA] (1999) found that only 15 - 26% of 
respondents were aware of the voluntary casino exclusion programme at the provinces two 
casinos.  Steinberg and Velardo (2002) found that only five percent of 184 surveyed self-
excludees learned about the self-exclusion programme at Mohegan Sun casino through 
literature available at the casino.  Most learned about the programme from friends or family 
(39%) or from Gamblers Anonymous (14%).  In a follow-up survey, half of 20 respondents 
indicated that the self-exclusion program was not advertised enough.  Ladouceur et al. (2000) 
found that many excludees in their Québec study would have excluded themselves sooner 
had they known about the programme, and consequently, would have lost less money. 
 
Somewhat higher awareness was found in the Netherlands.  Almost half of the 972 casino 
visitors and 50 problem gamblers surveyed were aware of Holland Casinos prevention 
policy- 74% of casino visitors and 84% of problem gamblers were aware of self-exclusion, 
and 48% of casino visitors and 54% of problem gamblers were aware of visit limitation, 
whereby individuals can ask the casino to limit their visits to a maximum of eight per month.  
Only 42% of both groups were aware of the brochure, The Risks of the Game, which 
outlines the difference between recreational and problematic gambling and offers contact 
information for those seeking help.  This brochure is placed in prominent locations 
throughout the casinos, including the entrance area beside the Rules of the Game booklet 
(De Bruin et al. 2001).   
 
Even where self-exclusion programmes are advertised, critics have pointed out that some 
casinos do not take requests for self-exclusion seriously or put up barriers for people who 
want to sign self-exclusion contracts (APC 1999, Norris 1999).  For example, in the state of 
Washington, the Gaming Association adopted a voluntary problem-gaming policy, including 
self-barring, in 1999.  Because the policy is voluntary, casinos are under no legal obligation 
to comply with requests for self-bans.  Some casinos do not allow the practice and refuse to 
honour requests for self-exclusion, perhaps because they do not want to be liable for losses 
that might occur if people break their bans (Podsada 2001).   
 
An argument can also be made that casinos have a vested interest in not promoting the 
availability of self-exclusion contracts, as problem gamblers contribute a large proportion of 
their revenues.  There is debate about the exact proportion, but estimates have ranged from 
15% to 33% (Abbott and Volberg 2000; APC 1999; Gerstein et al. 1999; Lesieur 1998).  It 
may be overly cynical to suggest that casinos really do not want to deter problem gamblers.  
However, it is also clear that gambling is a commercial enterprise and priorities lie with 
revenue generation.  As evidence of this, Manitoba has a total of 545 people who have signed 
exclusion contracts because of problem gambling, compared to 729 casino-initiated 
involuntary exclusions for other reasons (K. Langevin, MLC, personal communication, Aug. 
20/01). 
 
It should be mandatory for gaming venues to act on attempts by gamblers to self-exclude.  
Mandatory advertising and promotion are also essential, as it is not reasonable to leave this 
task to individual venues.  Monitoring of casino self-exclusion programmes by a regulatory 
body, as occurs in Australia, would ensure that venues are complying and implementing self-
exclusion programmes.  All venues should be required to prominently display information 
about the availability of the self-exclusion programme and how it works.  There is good 
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consensus that better awareness of the programme is needed to increase policy effectiveness 
(APC 1999, De Bruin et al. 2001, IGT 2000, Ladouceur et al. 2000, NSAGA 1999). 
 
Recommendation #2:  Irrevocable contracts and minimum ban length of 5 years 
There does not seem to be agreement on the appropriate length for a self-exclusion contract.  
Some jurisdictions have irrevocable, lifetime contracts (e.g., Missouri, USA).  Others place a 
limit on the ban, with a minimum of six months to a maximum of two to five years.  Some 
jurisdictions allow self-exclusion agreements to be revoked, providing an opportunity for 
gamblers to have their access to gaming venues reinstated.   
 
Self-exclusion programmes have little value if individuals can change their mind at any time 
and be permitted to enter gaming facilities.  Revocable bans defeat the entire purpose of self-
exclusion contracts, which is to set up some enduring external constraints for people 
attempting to curb their gambling, usually after internal constraints have failed.  Self-
exclusion needs to be irrevocable.  There is also some evidence that individuals prefer 
lengthier, irrevocable contracts.  In a follow-up survey of 20 self-excluded individuals, 
Steinberg and Velardo (2002) found that 60% preferred a permanent self-exclusion with no 
possibility of an appeal, 15% preferred a permanent self-exclusion with the possibility of an 
appeal, and 25% preferred a time-limited exclusion, with a mean length of time preferred of 
three years.  In Québec, most self-excluded patrons (60%) choose the maximum ban length of 
five years.  In 2001, a total of 1,993 out of 3,331 chose the maximum five-year ban compared 
to 18  (0.005 %) who chose a ban length of six months (Loto-Québec 2001b).   
 
Lengthier exclusions may also result in a decreased likelihood of relapse.  In the Netherlands, 
individuals who chose protective measures for an indefinite time period had the lowest and 
most stable visiting frequencies when they returned to the casino, compared to others with 
shorter contracts (De Bruin et al.  2001). 
 
There is very little evidence from the gambling treatment literature concerning the 
appropriate length of abstinence necessary to prevent problem gambling relapse.  However, 
there is information from the substance abuse literature.  What is very clear is that abstinence 
periods of three to six months are commonly achieved, but they have almost no predictive 
value in preventing relapse of substance abuse (Brecht, von Mayrhauser, and Anglin 2000; 
Nides et al. 1995; Schuckitt, Tippe, Smith, and Bucholz 1997; Yates, Reed, Booth, Masterson 
1994). Evidence suggests that periods of two years or more are necessary to prevent relapse 
in the majority of cases (Nides et al. 1995; Vaillant 1995).  For alcohol abuse, 25% will still 
relapse after four years of abstinence and 7% will still relapse after six years (Vaillant 1995).  
However, it is important to note that these relapse rates are for individuals who are largely 
exerting self-control strategies.  There is evidence that treatments involving external controls 
(e.g., disulfiram for alcoholism) tend to be somewhat less effective (Hughes and Cook 1997; 
Miller et al. 1995).  Thus, we believe it would be a prudent policy at this stage for casino ban 
lengths to be irrevocable for a minimum of 5 years. 
 
Recommendation #3: Jurisdictional-wide programmes administered by the jurisdictional 
regulatory body  
In all of the Canadian provinces (except Québec), gamblers sign up for self-exclusion from 
all provincial casinos simultaneously.  In countries such as The Netherlands (Holland 
Casinos), South Africa (Sun International Casinos), Switzerland, Poland (Casinos Poland), 
France (Casinos de France), and Sweden, self-exclusion applies to all casinos in the country. 
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Noteworthy exceptions include parts of the United States, where self-exclusion may be 
available at individual venues or groups of venues.  Harrahs Entertainment has its own self-
restriction programme that covers its 23 casinos.  Also, Global Cash Access (GCA) has 
developed a programme called S.T.E.P. - Self-Transaction Exclusion Program.  S.T.E.P. 
provides a way for patrons to exclude themselves from GCAs cash access network in more 
than 1,200 gaming locations in the USA.  It also allows patrons to set their own cash                        
withdrawal limits (Global Cash Access 2001).  Some states, such as Missouri, have state-
wide programmes for casinos.   
 
Without jurisdictional standardisation, each gaming venue within a jurisdiction could have its 
own self-exclusion list.  It may be difficult for gamblers to exclude themselves from all the 
venues they could visit, particularly in metropolitan areas with high levels of accessibility.  
The effectiveness of a self-exclusion contract will always be limited if a problem gambler has 
ready access to nearby venues that do not have self-exclusion policies.  Even if all venues do 
have self-exclusion policies, problem gamblers may be deterred from entering into self-
exclusion if they must establish individual contracts with each venue.  
 
As part of jurisdictional standardization, there should also be a standardised procedure for 
signing self-exclusion agreements.  Critics of the New Jersey self-exclusion programme, for 
example, note that gamblers can sign up in Atlantic City and Trenton but not other parts of 
the state (Weinert 2001).  In addition, many self-exclusion programmes, including several 
Canadian provincial programmes, require the patron to sign or renew agreements at one of 
the casinos.  This procedure is ironic, considering that the purpose of self-exclusion is to 
prevent people from entering casinos and being tempted to gamble.  If self-exclusion 
programmes were standardised, a uniform procedure could be made available by mail, e-
mail, or through a third party (i.e., regulator) in order to avoid the risk of entering the casino 
again.   
 
Recommendation #4: Extending exclusion to all gaming venues, and restricting all gambling 
to gaming venues 
Even where casino exclusion is standardised and applied to all casinos within a specified 
area, most self-exclusion policies have not been applied to other gaming venues, such as 
bingo halls, racetracks, or sites with electronic gaming machines (EGMs).  There is evidence 
that this may change, however. In Ontario, Canada, self-exclusion applies to 8 casinos and 15 
slots-at-tracks facilities, and in British Columbia, plans are being developed to implement 
self-exclusion at 37 bingo halls in the province.   
 
A great deal of gambling takes place outside of casinos.  In Canada, approximately 2.6 billion 
gross revenue derives from casinos, but an equivalent amount of 2.4 billion derives from 
video lottery terminals (VLTs) outside of casinos (Azmier 2001).   In the province of Québec, 
net revenue from casinos totalled 299 million dollars in 2000/01, while net revenue from 
VLTs was over 639 million (Loto Québec 2001a).   In Australia, gaming machines are a 
major source of gambling problems.  There are 104,000 gaming machines located in New 
South Wales clubs and hotels, and the state reports the highest prevalence of problem 
gambling (2.6%).  In Western Australia, where there are no gaming machines outside of the 
Perth casino, the state reports the lowest prevalence of problem gambling (0.7%) (McMillen 
2002). 
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In cases where individuals sign self-exclusion agreements that effectively keep them out of 
casinos, they may continue to have access to other types of gambling.  Most problem 
gamblers play a wide variety of games in a wide variety of venues.  A study in the 
Netherlands found that nearly half of all problem gamblers looked for alternative ways to 
gamble while excluded from Holland Casinos, by accessing illegal gambling activities, 
choosing alternatives like amusement arcades or the Internet, or crossing the border to 
gamble (De Bruin et al. 2001).  Similarly, Ladouceur et al. (2000) found that 50% of self-
excluded patrons engaged in some other form of gambling, such as video poker.  Steinberg 
and Velardo (2002) found that over one-third of 184 individuals signing casino self-exclusion 
agreements had problems with non-casino forms of gambling.  Thus, it seems clear that self-
exclusion policies would be most effective if they extended to all major gaming venues (i.e., 
bingo halls and racetracks), and if EGMs were removed from non-gaming facilities.  Policies 
should also apply to on-line gambling, in jurisdictions where this exists.  The Netherlands has 
taken the lead in extending casino self-banning to its on-line gambling site.  
 
Recommendation #5: Computerised identification checks for enforcement of self-exclusion  
Enforcing self-exclusion appears to be a universal problem in the gaming industry.  Under 
most self-exclusion programmes, gaming venue staff, usually security guards, are required to 
be familiar with the photographs of self-excluded persons.  While this may be somewhat 
effective for individuals who have frequented a particular casino, it is not as feasible for 
individuals who have been excluded from other casinos.  In addition, many individuals will 
go to great lengths to change their appearance to avoid detection.   
 
Although there are jurisdictions that report large numbers of detections (e.g., Québec), there 
are also frequent reports of lax detection in these same jurisdictions.  In Ladouceur et al. 
(2000)s study, 36% of Québec excludees went back to the casino during their self-exclusion 
period, returning a median of six times.  These individuals reported it was easy to return to 
the casino without being identified, despite the presence of trained staff.  In Missouri, most 
violators are caught only when claiming large jackpots or trying to get checks cashed, at 
which point they are required to show identification (Yerak 2001).  A final consideration is 
that as the number of self-excluded gamblers continues to increase, the ability to effectively 
detect all of these individuals decreases. It is not possible for security personnel to remember 
the pictures of thousands of individuals.   
 
Improvements to self-exclusion could be made by requiring all gaming venue patrons to 
provide scannable identification, such as a drivers license or passport, when entering a 
gaming venue.  All venues could be hooked up to a low-cost on-line computerised database 
containing the names of self-excluded individuals, making it extremely difficult for them to 
enter any gaming venue.  This system would have the added benefit of preventing minors 
from entering gaming areas.  Some European countries (e.g. Switzerland, Poland and Austria) 
already require identification checks.  In Great Britain, you must be a member or a guest to 
play in a casino.  In the Netherlands, Holland Casino uses a computer system that registers all 
visits by guests.  The system holds the records of visitors who have requested a ban or visit 
limitation.  All 12 casinos are linked into the system, ensuring immediate detection of self-
excluded individuals.  
 
Holland Casinos visitor registration system goes a step further, in that the history and 
visiting frequency of any visitor can be checked at any time at all Holland Casino sites.  The 
system can also generate reports on the number of protective measures requested, signs of 
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compulsive gambling (sudden increase in frequency of visits), and the number of talks staff 
have with visitors about compulsive gambling (see Recommendation # 8) (De Bruin et al. 
2001).  Effectiveness percentages can be computed for each casino, thus providing a 
management tool that enables casinos to make mutual comparisons.  National and/or local 
gambling figures can be reviewed immediately, and consequently, trends can be reacted to 
and policy adjusted more quickly (Holland Casino 2000).                                       
 
Computer registration would be most easily accomplished in Europe, where the government 
has traditionally had a critical role in the operation and regulation of gambling venues.  
European casinos are relatively small and admissions are closely monitored.   As is the case 
with Australian clubs, access is usually restricted to members.  Some casinos do not allow 
local residents to gamble.  Entrance fees may be charged, dress codes are the norm, and 
identification and/or registration is required.  Casinos operate with limited hours, rather than 
24-hour access.  Taxes are high, advertisement/promotion is non-existent, and credit policies 
are restrictive.  Most casinos already have self-exclusion policies, and some allow third-
party exclusions whereby families can impose a ban on a family member with gambling 
problems (Thompson 2001). 1   
 
In North America, where governments are less involved in gaming operations, computerised 
registration may be viewed as an infringement on an individuals right to privacy.  
Computerised identification checks therefore may be viewed as more palatable and less 
intrusive.  The North American approach to casino self-exclusion is more passive, as it 
assumes that individuals must take responsibility for their actions and make decisions about 
their gambling behaviour.  In Europe and Australia, however, a much more proactive 
approach is common, whereby governments are actively involved and take a responsibility of 
due care in their commitment to responsible gambling.  Adopting computerised registration 
in North America is a practical possibility, but would require a fundamental shift in the way 
government is involved in gambling.  At the very least, computerised identification checks 
could be implemented to enforce self-exclusion.  Self-exclusion policies will continue to be 
little more than lip-service unless such measures are taken.   
 
Recommendation #6: Penalties for both venue and gambler upon violation of agreement 
There is debate about the appropriate penalties for breaching a contract, with some 
jurisdictions having no penalties and others having fines or criminal charges.  Some people 
have argued that venue operators should be held legally responsible for breaches of self-
exclusion to better ensure enforcement of the programme (IGT 2000).  An argument can also 
be made that casinos have a responsibility analogous to drinking establishments that cannot 
serve alcohol to intoxicated individuals.  However, from a treatment perspective, it is also 
important that the gambler take responsibility for his or her actions.  We believe that both 
parties bear ethical responsibility to uphold the contract and that this is also how maximal 
effectiveness would best be achieved. 
 
It is also clear that there needs to be a penalty for both casinos and self-excluded individuals, 
to provide a deterrent and ensure compliance.  The lack of penalties in certain jurisdictions 
contributes to the frequency with which people repeatedly breach their contracts (e.g., 
                                                
1 Third-party exclusions, however, have had limited success in Australia and are controversial due to the possibility of 
malicious applications and the violation of the individual legal rights of gamblers (J. McMillen, Australian Institute for 
Gambling Research, personal communication, March 15, 2002). 
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Ladouceur et al. 2000).  In Québec, a large number of self-excluded people are said to be 
detected in their attempts to enter the casinos.  At the Montreal casino, the shift manager in 
charge of security guards reports that the four security guards whose main job is to look for 
these gamblers, spot and expel about 800 or 900 of them every month (Norris 1999).  
However, because there is no penalty for violation of a self-exclusion agreement, many of 
these people are the same individuals who have been expelled earlier.It is less clear what that 
penalty should be.  Casinos in New Jersey, USA that knowingly fail to bar self-excluded 
gamblers must forfeit any winnings and are subject to a fine or other penalties (Weinert 
2001).  All money forfeited by both casinos and gamblers is divided between the states 
casino-revenue fund and treatment programmes for compulsive gamblers (Rosenberg 2001). 
 
With regard to individuals who breach their agreements, some argue for a non-financial 
penalty, such as a community service. This would recognise that problem gamblers 
difficulties are principally financial in nature and that monetary penalties may create 
incentives for more gambling (to make up the loss) or impose hardships on the families of the 
problem gamblers (APC 1999).  In addition, it has been argued that gamblers should not face 
prosecution for trespassing, as such a charge would criminalise their behaviour on the basis 
of a programme they have entered voluntarily and fails to acknowledge the degree of 
compulsion people may be struggling against (IGT 2000).    
 
The issue of imposing a penalty on gamblers and venues would be less relevant if a 
computerised registration system were developed (see recommendation # 5).  Presumably, 
self-excluded patrons would be detected immediately upon their attempts to enter the venue, 
at which time they would be refused access.  However, if casinos are reluctant to implement 
such a system, a financial penalty for casinos and a trespassing charge for individuals would 
provide a deterrent, and hopefully lead to compliance. 
 
Recommendation #7: Optional counselling and mandatory gambling education seminar prior 
to reinstatement 
It is widely believed that problem gamblers who sign voluntary exclusion agreements have 
taken an important first step, but they still need counselling or treatment to successfully deal 
with their gambling problem.  This need for further help and support was expressed by many 
people signing self-exclusion contracts in Ladouceur et al.s (2000) study.  A study in the 
Netherlands found that the chances of sustaining success increases if the decision to take 
protective measures is combined with some type of care or support (De Bruin et al. 2001).   
 
However, there is debate over compulsory counselling.  For example, it is not known if all 
self-excludees need treatment (Eisenberg, Griffiths, Maurer, and Whyte 2001).  Furthermore, 
it is unclear how effective compulsory counselling would be.  Self-motivation and 
willingness to participate are important steps toward recovery.  Individuals having difficulties 
regulating their gambling activities may not be ready to seek professional help.  When the 
step of seeking professional help appears to be a barrier, self-exclusion alone may be 
attractive as a less intrusive procedure for gaining self-control (Ladouceur et al 2000). 
 
When signing self-exclusion contracts, individuals could be provided with professional 
contacts, and strongly encouraged to seek counselling.  Relationships between the gaming 
industry and treatment facilities should be improved, to ensure that self-excluded individuals 
have access to help and have opportunities to create support networks (NSAGA 1999, De 
Bruin et al. 2001).  Rather than mandatory counselling, a brief responsible gambling 
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education seminar should be made compulsory for reinstatement.  In Canada, Manitoba is the 
only province with a gambling awareness workshop at the end of a voluntary exclusion 
contract.  Individuals must participate in order to be granted re-entry into the provinces 
casinos.   
 
Recommendation #8: Increased training and education of casino employees 
According to Quinn (2001), casinos should be leaders in the recognition and identification of 
pathological gamblers.  However, it is likely that most problem gamblers are never 
approached by casino employees.  Steinberg and Velardo (2002) found that only 11% of 184 
self-excluded individuals found out about self-exclusion from a casino employee.  Self-
exclusion programmes could be improved by educating casino employees about the signs and 
symptoms of problem gambling.  In the Netherlands and Switzerland, prevention measures 
include training programmes for all staff members to recognise signs of trouble at an early 
stage.  With the aid of their computerised visitor registration system, Holland Casino can 
monitor the visiting frequency of their guests in every casino, and detect possible problem 
gambling.  Staff are encouraged to be proactive, and approach individuals and recommend 
protective measures when they feel this is warranted (Holland Casino 2000, Haefeli 2002).  
 
It is well known in the addiction treatment community that milder and less entrenched 
problems are much easier to rectify and treat than serious, well-established ones.  Thus, there 
would be real benefits to casino staff intervening with people at risk for gambling problems 
before a serious problem develops.  This occurs at Holland Casino, where a large percentage 
of requests for protective measures are made by people who do not yet meet the criteria for 
pathological gambling, but wish to prevent problems (De Bruin et al. 2001).   
 
The computerised visitor registration system at Holland Casino allows for the early 
identification of problem gambling: it detects increases in gambling frequency, and provides 
automatic notification when a guest attends Holland Casino 20 times or more over a period of 
three to six months (De Bruin et al. 2001, Holland Casino 2000).  This notification allows 
employees to approach potential players-at-risk for an interview.  An interview involves 
talking with the guest, and it generally steers the individual toward a protective measure.  
While guests are free to refuse such a measure, most interviews result in either a self-
exclusion or visit limitation agreement (Holland Casino 2000).  A study found that of 790 
patrons detected and approached, 85% accepted a protective measure (i.e., ban or visit 
limitation), 13% greatly reduced their visits of their own accord, and only 2% showed no 
response to the interview (Holland Casino 2000).   
 
When appropriate, a visit limitation may be recommended to individuals who have completed 
a self-exclusion.  Approximately 40% of guests accept a visit limitation when their self-
exclusion agreement expires.  If an individual decides not to sign a visit limitation agreement, 
casino staff will approach the individual for an interview should visiting frequency increase 
within six months or exceed the norm of eight visits per month.  Approximately half of those 
who do not initially sign a visit limitation agreement eventually do (Holland Casino 2000).   
 
Another advantage of staff training is that it does not leave the entire responsibility to request 
self-exclusion to the problem gambler.  A substantial number of problem gamblers do not 
believe they have a problem.  In the 1999 prevalence study of gambling in New Zealand, only 
half of the people classified as problem or pathological gamblers indicated that they 
considered themselves to have experienced problems with gambling (Abbott and Volberg 
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2000).  In the Australian national study, 15% of people scoring at problem gambling levels 
(SOGS 5+) did not believe they had a problem and another 28% believed their problems were 
minor (APC 1999).  
 
Discussion 
 
There is very little research on casino self-exclusion programmes or how to best optimise 
their effectiveness.  What is known is that in most jurisdictions only a very small minority of 
problem gamblers use these programmes.  For those that do, the impact of self-exclusion on 
overall gambling behaviour is uncertain, although it is clear that a significant percentage 
successfully find other ways to gamble.  Evidence does suggest that most excludees do not 
return to the casino they banned themselves from, although a minority return many times, 
illustrating that enforcement is a serious problem for most programmes.   
 
More research is needed to better address these issues.  However, at this juncture there is 
enough evidence to indicate that these programmes need to be better utilised and more 
effectively implemented.  Cross-jurisdictional analysis and common-sense reasoning suggest 
some ways in which that can be accomplished.  At the very least, the following 
recommendations could serve as hypotheses or propositions for further research: 
 
1. Mandatory promotion. 
2. Irrevocable contracts and a minimum ban length of 5 years. 
3. Jurisdictional-wide programmes administered by the jurisdictional regulatory body. 
4. Extending exclusion to all gaming venues and restricting all gambling to gaming venues. 
5. Computerised identification checks for enforcement of self-exclusion contracts.  
6. Penalties for both venue and gambler upon violation of the contract. 
7. Optional counselling and a mandatory gambling education seminar prior to reinstatement. 
8. Increased training and education of casino employees. 
 
Implementing some of these recommendations may require a shift in the approach to problem 
gambling.  In North America, there is often a belief that primary responsibility for regulating 
gambling behaviour rests with the individual gambler.  This is in contrast to other parts of the 
world such as Europe and Australia where government and industry have accepted greater 
ownership of problem gambling and taken a more active role in curbing it.  Regardless of 
theoretical orientation, however, it is clear that a more active role by government and industry 
is needed for casino self-exclusion to be optimally effective.   
 
It is also important to realise that effective self-exclusion does not necessarily have a serious 
negative impact on profits.  The Netherlands is a good example of a country with a thriving 
casino industry as well as an effective self-exclusion policy.  As stated in their own literature, 
Holland Casinos has found a workable balance between efforts to prevent compulsive 
gambling and making a profit.  It would appear that good visitor care is not an obstacle to a 
profitable turnover (De Bruin et al. 2001).  The Netherlands is attempting to achieve what 
everyone wishes for, which is to maximise the benefits of gambling and minimise the harm. 
 
Finally, it must be noted that the development of effective self-exclusion programmes is only 
one of many policy tools that are needed to minimise problem gambling.  Researchers have 
suggested several others: e.g., limiting casino hours of operation; removing automated 
banking machines from casinos; eliminating house credit; eliminating smoking and/or 
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drinking from gaming venues; changing gaming environments to make people more aware of 
the current time and how to exit the establishment; and introducing responsible gaming 
features on EGMs (e.g., eliminating bill takers, reducing the speed, interrupting play at 
regular intervals, regular postings of how much time and money have been spent, etc.) 
(McMillen 2002; Quinn 2001).   
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